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THE DUTY TO CHARGE IN POLICE USE OF
EXCESSIVE FORCE CASES
REBECCA ROIPHE*
ABSTRACT
Responding to the problems of mass incarceration, racial disparities in justice,
and wrongful convictions, scholars have focused on prosecutorial overcharging.
They have, however, neglected to address underchargingthe failure to charge in
entire classes of cases. Undercharging can similarly undermine the efficacy and
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. While few have focused on this question in
the domestic criminal law context, international law scholars have long recognized
the social and structural cost for nascent democratic states when they fail to charge
those responsible for the prior regime’s human rights abuses. This sort of impunity
threatens the rule of law and misses the opportunity to reinforce important
democratic values. This Article draws on international law scholarship to argue that
there is a duty to investigate and a limited duty to charge crimes that implicate core
democratic principles of equality and fairness. Police use of excessive force against
unarmed African-American suspects is just this sort of crime.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States is in the midst of what seems like an epidemic of police
shootings of unarmed black men. Cell phone videos made by bystanders or friends
of the victims animate the injustice. Black Lives Matter activists have mobilized the
resulting anger into a powerful social movement. Amidst all of this unrest, very few
of the involved police officers have been prosecuted.1 Even fewer have been

*

Professor of Law, New York Law School. J.D. Harvard Law School, Ph.D. University
of Chicago. I would like to thank Professor Ruti Teitel, whose scholarship inspired this paper.
Many thanks as well to the participants in the Symposium at Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law for their thoughtful comments.
1 One notable exception is a case in Charleston, which led to federal charges against the
officer for shooting an unarmed black man in the back. Chris Dixon & Tamar Lewin, South
Carolina Officer Faces Federal Charges in Fatal Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/us/south-carolina-officer-faces-federal-charges-in-fatalshooting.html.
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convicted and punished.2 Highlighting the difficulty inherent in these cases, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has reorganized its inquiry into the killing of Eric
Garner in Staten Island.3 In 2014, police officers approached Garner and accused
him of selling loose cigarettes.4 The officers then attempted to arrest Garner for his
alleged conduct.5 When Garner refused to submit, Officer Daniel Pantaleo used a
chokehold to subdue him. Garner died after repeating “I can’t breathe” to the officers
surrounding him.6 The entire incident was caught on video, spurring protests around
the country. After a Staten Island grand jury refused to indict Pantaleo, the DOJ
launched an investigation into a potential civil rights violation.7 The investigatory
team has subsequently split between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
agents and Brooklyn prosecutors—who do not believe charges are appropriate—and
those within the Civil Rights Division—who disagree.8
The controversy over the Eric Garner case illustrates both how difficult it is to
make decisions in these sensitive cases and the relative lack of guidance on when it
is appropriate, or even necessary, to bring charges. Criminal justice scholars have
examined and criticized prosecutors’ tendency to overcharge, bringing too many
charges against too many suspects.9 However, few have looked at the question of
when, if ever, a prosecutor must charge a case. There is no legal obligation for
prosecutors to seek indictments, even when the evidence supports a conviction.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether it would ever constitute an abuse of
discretion to fail to bring charges. This Article argues that prosecutors must
investigate and seek to indict in police shooting cases when there is sufficient
evidence to support charges. It is an abuse of discretion to fail to do so because the
2

Three of the officers accused of killing Freddie Gray in Baltimore were acquitted, and
the charges against the remaining officers were dismissed. Carolyn Sung & Catherine E.
Shoichet, Freddie Gray Case: Charges Dropped Against Remaining Officers, CNN (July 27,
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/27/us/freddie-gray-verdict-baltimore-officers/.
3

Matt Apuzzo et al., Justice Dept. Shakes up Inquiry into Eric Garner Chokehold Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/nyregion/justice-deptreplaces-investigators-on-eric-garner-case.html.
4

Id.

5 Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES
(June
13,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-policechokehold-staten-island.html.
6

Apuzzo et al., supra note 3.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

See, e.g., RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE ETHICS OF P LEA BARGAINING (2012); Kyle Graham,
Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 704-05 (2014); Bennett L. Gershman,
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L. J.
1259, 1279-81 (2011); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1711 (2010); Richard A. Bierschbach
& Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L. J. 1743, 1756-61 (2005); Tracey L Meares,
Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutors’ Discretion and Conduct with Financial
Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 853-54 (1995); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1960-64 (1992); Albert Altschuler, The
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-105 (1968).
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crime, which targets a minority group that the criminal justice system has
historically neglected and abused, implicates basic democratic principles of equality
and fairness.
While domestic criminal law scholars have not explored the question of
undercharging, international law scholars have. As states around the world transition
to democratic governments, many have debated the question of whether the new
government has an obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights abuses
under the previous regime. Drawing on international literature, this Article argues
that failing to charge a crime implicating fundamental democratic values, such as
police shootings of unarmed African-American men, is an abuse of prosecutorial
discretion. The inequality in treatment and racial disparity threaten the legitimacy of
the system itself. This effect is compounded by the historical treatment of AfricanAmericans in criminal courts.10 International law scholars who study transitional
justice have analyzed how the failure to charge can affect new democracies. Along
with criminal prosecutions, they have sought alternatives to charging particular
offenses, such as truth commissions, to reinforce those values without facing the
practical problems of charging every individual who has committed the crime.
Drawing on this robust literature, this Article argues that prosecutors have a duty to
charge the most culpable offenders in police shooting cases and suggests some
alternative mechanisms to supplement the criminal process when prosecution is
inappropriate or practical.
To make this argument, this Article first discusses the law governing
prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions. Despite efforts to legislate in this area,
prosecutors retain broad discretion. With the exception of a few instances in select
jurisdictions, there is no legal duty to charge. Next, this Article reviews classic
theoretical justifications for prosecution. The Article then looks to international law
scholarship for principles to guide domestic prosecutorial decision-making. It
concludes by bringing this all to bear on the question of how to handle the growing
number of police shootings of unarmed black men.
This Article concludes that is an abuse of discretion not to charge the most
culpable police officers, even when the evidence is imperfect or juries are unlikely to
convict. It is an abuse of discretion not because there is some absolute right to
accountability, but because the vast under-enforcement, especially in light of the
historic treatment of African-Americans, undermines the value of equality
fundamental to our democratic system. It weakens the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system and, with it, democracy itself. Because individual prosecutions will
not fully address this deficit, we should also turn to alternate mechanisms to
reinforce the fundamental democratic values of fairness, equality, and transparency
in the system.11

10 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1992).

THE

NEW JIM CROW (2010); PAUL FINKELMAN,

11

The model rule governing prosecutorial conduct is Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.8. It imposes limits on when a prosecutor can charge and pursue a prosecution but imposes
no affirmative obligation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A. Governing Law
There is no legal or ethical duty to prosecute. In fact, the Rules of Professional
Conduct focus more on imposing limits on prosecutors’ charging decisions.
Prosecutors cannot pursue charges that they know are not supported by probable
cause.12 The explanatory notes to the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct similarly emphasize the prosecutor’s duty to refrain from
aggressively seeking convictions by protecting the defendant’s procedural rights and
ensuring that there is sufficient evidence to convict.13 In other words, the rules of
professional ethics, like scholars and commentators, attempt to guard against
overcharging. To that end, the rules articulate professional obligations that restrain
prosecutors from pursuing convictions with too much zeal.
The American Bar Association’s criminal justice section also publishes
unenforceable guidelines or standards for prosecutors. Like the rules, the standards
instruct prosecutors that their job is not just to pursue convictions and that
sometimes restraint is in order.14 The standards do urge prosecutors to investigate
crimes if other agencies fail to do so,15 and they state that prosecutors should not be
deterred from prosecuting serious crimes by the fact that juries tend to acquit persons
accused of similar acts.16 By stating these obligations, the bar reminds prosecutors
that part of their job is to pursue convictions against the guilty despite political
obstacles and any difficulty in proving their cases. Notwithstanding these few
reminders, professional standards emphasize obligations to avoid overcharging and
give little guidance about when, if ever, prosecutors ought to pursue charges.17 They
state, for example, that prosecutors have broad discretion in determining if charges
are appropriate18 and need not prosecute a case even when the evidence supports it.19
The standards, like the rules, warn prosecutors against mindlessly seeking
convictions.20 The professional guidelines do not establish or even hint at a duty to
charge or a right of accountability.
12

Id.

13

Id. at cmt. 1.

14 CRIM. JUST. SEC. STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(c) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017).
15

Id. at Standard 3-3.1(a).

16

Id. at Standard 3-3.9(e).

17

See generally id.

18

Id. at Standard 3-3.4(a).

19

Id. at Standard 3-3.9(a), (b).

20

Id. at Standard 3-3.6(c) (urging prosecutors to recommend that the grand jury not indict
if he or she believes the evidence does not warrant it); see also id. at Standards 3-3.8 (urging
prosecutors to consider noncriminal disposition in appropriate cases and noting that
prosecutors should be familiar with social agencies that can divert cases from the criminal
process), 3-3.9(d) (stating that in making the decision to charge, prosecutors should give no
weight to personal or political advantage), 3-3.9(f) (stating that prosecutor should not seek
charges greater than can be supported by the evidence and fairly reflect the crime).
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Courts similarly shy away from invitations to regulate prosecutors’ charging
decisions. In doing so, case law acknowledges that the prosecutor has a quasijudicial role with broad discretion to determine when charges are appropriate.21 In
State v. Winne, for instance, a New Jersey court dismissed an indictment against a
prosecutor for failing to charge individuals with illegal gambling.22 Amidst concerns
about gambling and official corruption, a special prosecutor sought to indict the
Bergen County District Attorney for failing to prosecute those involved in the
criminal syndicate.23 The court insisted that such a prosecution for nonfeasance of a
public duty should only proceed if the state could prove evil motive.24 Otherwise, the
court reasoned, prosecutors would be fearful in declining to bring charges, which
constitutes an essential part of their official discretion.25 The court reasoned that a
prosecutor could choose to commence or drop charges for a number of reasons.26 It
is the prosecutor’s job to weigh countless factors in determining what justice
requires.27 Indicting the prosecutor for failing to pursue gambling cases would
interfere with the administration of justice by injecting a fear of retribution into the
prosecutors’ determination, which ought to be motivated solely by the interests of
justice.
In federal court, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) provides that the
government can dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint “with leave of the
court.”28 The Supreme Court declined to decide whether courts could deny
prosecutors’ uncontested motions to dismiss charges.29 In doing so, it noted that a
court’s review is primarily designed to protect defendants from harassment, but there
may also be a limited right to review prosecutors’ decisions if they are clearly
contrary to the public interest.30 Most jurisdictions that have considered this
21

State v. Winne, 91 A.2d 65, 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1952).

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 79.

26

Id. at 77.

27

Id.

28

FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).

29

United States v. Gonzales, 58 F.3d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1995).

30

Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 34 n.15 (1977). Most federal courts similarly
restrict the courts’ ability to deny the government’s motion to dismiss an indictment to cases
in which it is clearly in the public interest to do so. See United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157,
159 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the court must grant motions that are not motivated by bad
faith); United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that the
primary purpose of Rule 48(a) is to protect a defendant from “harassment, through a
prosecutor’s charging, dismissing without having placed a defendant in jeopardy, and
commencing another prosecution at a different time or place deemed more favorable to the
prosecution,” but the court can also ask for an explanation of why the dismissal is in the
public interest). The Seventh Circuit read the rule more narrowly to prohibit courts from
denying an uncontested motion, even if the court found that the prosecution was acting in bad
faith. In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. JacoboZavala, 241 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating courts can only deny a motion to dismiss
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particular issue refuse to allow courts to deny uncontested motions for dismissal
except in extreme cases.31 Like the court in Winne, federal courts recognize that
prosecutors are better situated to evaluate the propriety of a criminal charge.32
Separation of powers concerns mandate a narrow review of charging decisions.
In general, only the elected or appointed prosecutor can decide whether to bring
charges.33 Some states, however, have statutes allowing private citizens to petition
courts or other officials to prosecute alleged criminal conduct. Concerned citizens
used such a law in Ohio to request a grand jury investigation into Officer Timothy
Loehmann for killing Tamir Rice, a twelve-year old African-American boy, who was
shot while reaching for a toy gun.34 Several other states provide some mechanism for
citizens to initiate charges with approval of a court or other government officer,35 but
charges if “the government’s motion is contrary to manifest public interest because it is not
based in the prosecutor’s good faith discharge of her duties”); Gonzalez, 58 F.3d at 462
(reserving the question of whether the district court can ever deny an uncontested motion and
noting that if it does, it can only do so in “exceptional circumstances”); United States v.
Welborn, 849 F.2d 980, 983 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding district courts may deny untested
motions only “in extremely limited circumstances in extraordinary cases . . . when the
prosecutor’s actions clearly indicate a betrayal of the public interest”).
31

United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 515 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, Woodruff v.
United States, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (ruling that the federal court in Texas exceeded its
authority by denying the Government’s dismissal motion because the government had offered
support for its decision, which was “not clearly contrary to the public interest”).
32

Winne, 91 A.2d at 72-84.
33

In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., the Supreme Court held that a mother did not have
standing to compel a Texas prosecutor to bring charges against her husband for failure to pay
support for her child who was born out of wedlock. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973). The mother disagreed with the prosecutor who interpreted the statute to apply only to
legitimate children. Id. at 614-16. In deciding the case, the Court noted that “a private citizen
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Id. at
619; see also Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 357, 374 (1986) (explaining the history of private prosecution and noting that
currently, “[c]ourts generally grant the public prosecutor the exclusive power to initiate
criminal proceedings”).
34

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.09(D) (LexisNexis 2017) provides:

A private citizen having knowledge of the facts who seeks to cause an arrest or
prosecution under this section may file an affidavit charging the offense committed
with a reviewing official for the purpose of review to determine if a complaint should
be filed by the prosecuting attorney or attorney charged by law with the prosecution of
offenses in the court or before the magistrate.
This process was adopted in 2006 to replace an older process by which a private citizen could
charge a crime directly without review by any government official. State v. Mbodji, 951
N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ohio 2011).
35

GA. CODE § 17-4-40(b)(1) (2010) (allowing citizen to make a request for criminal
process to begin); IDAHO STAT. tit. 19 § 501 (2016) (allowing citizen to apply to court for an
arrest warrant); MD. STAT. § 2-607(c)(6) (2015) (allowing citizen to apply to a commissioner
who may issue a summons or, under limited circumstances, an arrest warrant); MINN. STAT.
§§ 388.12, 8.01 (2016) (allowing citizens to appear before grand juries, petition district courts,
appoint special prosecutors, and ask the governor to direct the attorney general to commence
prosecution.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-304 (2005) (allowing private citizen to seek arrest

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/6

6

2017]

THE DUTY TO CHARGE

509

most impose restrictions on private access to the criminal justice process.36 The
majority of jurisdictions vest discretion entirely with the prosecutor and forbid
private initiation of criminal charges.37
The fact that the law largely leaves the charging decision to the prosecutor does
not end the inquiry. Professional standards govern prosecutors’ decisions, but they
offer limited guidance about when and whom to charge. Theories of punishment
provide a starting point for analyzing this question. Prosecutors should start with a
goal in order to determine who to punish and what sort of penalty to seek. Theories
about the purpose of criminal penalties also help set the groundwork for
understanding the limits of punishment in the criminal justice system. While there
are many variations, the three most important theories of criminal justice for the
purposes of this Article are retribution, deterrence, and other consequentialist
theories.
B. Justification
Generally, retributive theories of justice rest on the assumption that guilty people
deserve to be punished.38 The severity of the punishment ought to be proportional to

warrant or summons); S.C. CODE § 22-5-110 (2011) (allowing private citizen to initiate a
criminal case by requesting a magistrate to issue a summons); VA. STAT. § 19.2-72 (2016)
(allowing private citizen complaints in writing). In Texas, private citizens can seek indictment
directly from a grand jury. Douglas E. Baloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially
Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1142 (2007).
36 Taliaferro v. Locke, 182 Cal. App. 2d 752, 757 (1960) (rejecting mandamus to compel
the district attorney to initiate prosecution); State ex rel. Freed v. Cir. Ct. of Martin County, 14
N.E.2d 910 (Ind. 1938) (nullifying lower court’s order forcing the prosecutor to approve an
affidavit in support of a criminal charge); Lutz v. Commonwealth, 505 A.2d 1356, 1356-57
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (denying petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the attorney
General to investigate and prosecute a District Attorney for fraud).
37 Smith v. United States, No. 97-10025-PBS, 2013 WL 2154004, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
69778, at *1 (D. Mass. May 15, 2013) (holding that a private citizen cannot file a criminal
complaint in federal court and there is no right to require the government to initiate criminal
proceedings); Roberts v. State, 280 Ga. App. 672, 674 (2006) (stating that “neither an accused
nor a third-party private citizen may prosecute a criminal matter on his or her own”); Santiage
v. Clerk Mag. of Clinton Dist. Ct., No. 0600397, 2006 WL 2848120, 2006 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 431, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 2006) (denying a writ of mandamus ordering the
clerk to accept an application for a criminal complaint); State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d
361, 385 (Minn. 1977) (allowing private access to grand juries and district courts to use other
mechanisms to petition for prosecution but denying the citizen the right to prosecute a crime
himself); State v. Czartorsky, No. a-4384-07T4, 2009 WL 1228442, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 1087, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (holding that a private citizen lacks
standing to object to a lack of probable cause determination); Seeton v. Adams, 50 A.3d 268,
269-70 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (holding writ of mandamus cannot be used to correct the
district attorney’s allegedly mistaken view of a criminal statute); In re Richland County
Mag.’s Ct., 389 S.C. 408, 414-15 (2010) (holding that a non-lawyer prosecuting a criminal
misdemeanor charge engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and condemning the
influence of private interests on public prosecution).
38 MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 104-88
(1997); JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 67 (1973).
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the severity of the crime.39 In turn, the gravity of the crime rests on the culpability of
the wrongdoer and the harm to the victim.40 Philosophers have posed retribution as a
theory for punishment for some time. Immanuel Kant reasoned that retribution was a
moral imperative.41 More recently, Herbert Morris argued that retribution is justified
because criminals are essentially free riders.42 They benefit from the fact that
everyone else in society has agreed not to commit crimes without adhering to that
agreement themselves.43 Unlike tort law, theories of retribution are concerned not
with compensating a victim, but with righting a wrong.44 In other words, retributive
theories insist that punishment is a way of repairing a moral injury.45
Retributive theories of justice, at least in the absolute sense, support a right to
accountability. In Morris’ formulation, the victim and the rest of the public who have
followed the rules have a moral right to see punishment for the person who abused
the trust.46 If the criminal justice system exists to mete out punishment for crimes,
then mandatory charging makes sense. It follows, without too many logical steps,
that if a wrongdoer deserves to be punished, the state has an obligation to do so.47
The strong retributive theory of justice does not offer much guidance to policy
makers who face external constraints. It offers little to prosecutors who have limited
budgets or concerns about the effect that prosecutions might have on the stability of
the government or the rule of law.48 Some scholars have modified retributivism by
arguing that anyone guilty of a crime deserves punishment, but the moral duty gives
way if it would result in some particularly bad result.49 If the negative consequence
of prosecution passes that threshold, then policy makers and prosecutors would be
justified in forgoing punishment.50 Others have conceded that retribution is not
possible for every criminal act,51 but is, on the whole, a social good. Therefore, the
39 Hugo Adam Bedau, Classification-Based Sentencing: Some Conceptual and Ethical
Problems, in [XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE] NOMOS 89, 102 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1985).
40

Id.

41

IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 100-03 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797).

OF

THE

42 Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 477 (1968), reprinted in
PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 74, 75-76 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 3d ed. 1985).
43

Id. at 477.

44 Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms vs. Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
U.C.L.A L. REV. 1659, 1663 (1992).
45

Id. at 1665.

46

Morris, supra note 42, at 477.

47 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 51 (1976); JOEL FEINBERG, DOING
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 103 (1970).

AND

48

Michael Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 820
(2007).
49

Id. at 830-31.

50

MOORE, supra note 38, at 732-34.

51

Cahill, supra note 48, at 828.
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criminal justice system should maximize retribution while tending to other needs,
such as budgetary restrictions.
Deterrence, a different rationale for criminal punishment, provides at least a
theoretical basis for decisions and priorities driven by a limited budget and other
concerns. Deterrence suggests that criminal actions are justified because they prevent
future harms by imposing costs on illegal conduct.52 Unlike retributivism, deterrence
focuses on the consequences of prosecution rather than moral imperatives.53 Thus,
scholars argue that deterrence pushes policy makers and prosecutors to minimize
social harm.54 Criminal sanctions are valuable not because they impose punishment
on the individual wrongdoer, but because they send a message to others. They
impose a cost, which will presumably change the calculus of those contemplating
similar anti-social acts in the future.
Deterrence provides greater guidance to policy makers because it involves a
formula, albeit a difficult one to calculate. Society ought to expend resources and
calibrate punishments so as to produce the greatest social value. Expending
resources on the investigation and prosecution of some crimes rather than others will
inevitably produce more value.55
In addition to retribution and deterrence, criminal sanctions can serve to reinforce
and communicate core values.56 Like deterrence, the expressive function of the
criminal law focuses on consequences of criminalization. Rather than calculating the
social costs of wrongful acts, however, it measures the importance of social meaning
and context.57 One of the important functions of the criminal justice system is
communicating and reinforcing shared social values.58 Émile Durkeim argued that
the penal system reinforces social solidarity by recognizing and broadcasting shared
moral values.59 Law-abiding citizens experience the exercise of criminal sanctions as
a validation and formulation of their social role—the bonds that tie them together.60
Those inclined to break the law may be immune to this social meaning but will
nonetheless be deterred from future bad acts.61 Of course, given the diversity of
52 Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV 413, 425 (1999)
[hereinafter Kahan, Secret Ambition].
53

Id. at 427.

54

Cahill, supra note 48, at 817-18.

55

Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 52, at 426-27.

56

Id. at 420-25. For a discussion of the theories of criminal punishment, see generally
DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY (1996).
57

Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 52, at 419-20.

58

FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 100; Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 604 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions].
59 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102-03, 105 (1933). Many have
criticized Durkheim for his overly rosy view of social solidarity or “common consciousness.”
Most prominently, Michel Foucault developed an alternate view of punishment in which is
both projects moral values of some and disciplines or forces others into compliance. MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 89-90, 194 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979).
60

DURKHEIM, supra note 59, at 102.

61

Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 58, at 604.
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moral views, criminal law can also be a site of conflict and hegemonic proclamations
about these norms.62
Scholars of transitional justice have emphasized this communicative value in
arguing that retribution alone is a poor rationale for criminal prosecutions.63 In most
fledgling democracies, prosecuting everyone involved in human rights violations
during a previous repressive regime is impossible. Doing so might undermine the
strength and durability of the new government. Therefore, these scholars suggest that
it is appropriate and necessary to single out some individuals for prosecution. In a
democratic system, this approach broadcasts the values central to the new regime
while simultaneously strengthening faith in the rule of law without toppling the
precarious new democracy.
C. International Law
This Article draws on international law because, unlike scholars of domestic
criminal law, international law scholars have thought deeply about the duty to charge
individuals for criminal wrongdoing. In addition, given the frequency of police
shootings of African-American men in the United States, police use of force shares
some similarities with the human rights abuses that invite the attention of
international law scholars. By drawing the parallel, however, this Article does not
intend to make an equivalence. The atrocity of human rights violations in the
Americas and elsewhere are incomparable both in brutality and scale to police
shootings. The comparison is nonetheless useful.
David Luban has defined crimes against humanity as crimes that undermine the
social and political nature of humankind.64 People are naturally social creatures, but
they need political organization in order to live together.65 Crimes against humanity
are, in Luban’s terms, politics turned “cancerous.”66 The complete failure to
prosecute is a social pathology that threatens the system itself.67 While the scope and
severity of police shootings of unarmed black men are not on the same scale as most
international human rights violations, they also implicate our political organization.
As they mount in number, they reflect a degeneration of the political world.68
Professor Luban also notes that crimes against humanity tend to target individuals
within a group precisely for their membership in that group.69 Police shootings may
be less consciously designed to terrorize a minority than many human rights

62

Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 52, at 421.

63 David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 576-77 (Samantha
Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
64 David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 160
(2004) [hereinafter Luban, A Theory].
65

Id. at 90.

66

Id.

67 Id.; Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice and Judicial Activism—A Right to Accountability?,
48 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 385, 395 (2015) [hereinafter Teitel, Transitional Justice].
68

Luban, A Theory, supra note 64, at 94.

69

Id. at 105.
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violations, but that is the effect.70 While police shootings lack the scope and savagery
typical of crimes against humanity, they share many of the other features.71 Part of
the horror of human rights abuses is the impunity: the fact that the government
tortured and abused citizens without accountability.72 Ironically, the very fact that
police shootings have gone unpunished creates a similarity to these international
atrocities.
The theoretical question of whether there ought to be a duty to charge for human
rights violations has preoccupied international law scholars. While scholars tend to
disagree about the scope of the duty to charge, most argue that some form of justice
and revelation of the truth about past crimes is essential to promote reconciliation
and reinforce democratic values.73 Diane Orentlicher, for instance, argues that there
is an absolute duty to prosecute human rights violations of a prior regime.74 She
reasons that a regime that fails to prosecute undermines the authority of the law and
jeopardizes the transition to democracy.75 But drawing on retributive theories of
justice, she also argues that atrocious crimes must be punished, especially those that
single out racial, ethnic, or religious groups.76 Victims and others in society enjoy a
right to accountability.77 Her view of the critical role criminal justice plays in
building a democracy echoes the philosophy of the trials at Nuremburg where the
highly publicized cases provided a public condemnation of the evils of Nazi
Germany.78
Most scholars, however, argue for a more pragmatic approach, combining
prosecutions with other mechanisms to help establish and affirm social norms. Jaime
Malamud-Goti asserts that democratic governments are required to proceed against
perpetrators of mass atrocities even at the risk of military rebellion but the failure to
punish all wrongdoers is not a breach of moral duty.79 Law is not merely a set of
rules.80 It is a vehicle for social change.81 Deeply embedded, determined, and in turn

70

TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 81 (2015).

71 Luban, A Theory, supra note 64, at 98-99 (arguing that crimes against humanity are
characterized by an ugliness, state-sponsorship, which makes them categorically worse than
ordinary crimes).
72

Id. at 117.

73

Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of
Transitional Justice in East Germany and South Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 89, 9192 (2001); Teitel, Transitional Justice, supra note 67, at 404-05.
74

Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2540 (1991).
75

Id. at 2543.
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Id. at 2594.
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Id. at 2580, 2613-14.
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Kristin Bohl, Breaking the Rules of Transitional Justice, 24 WISC. INT’L L. REV. 557,
558-59 n.8 (2006).
79 Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transition Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State
Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 5 (1990).
80

Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1967).
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transformative, law itself plays an important role in the transition from totalitarian
regimes to democratic governments.82
Some international law scholars argue that the rule of law requires prosecutions
of prior regime abuses. For a set of complex reasons, full accountability is often
impossible.83 Evidence is lost.84 The victims are dead or were so deeply incapacitated
that they cannot recall details of their torture.85 Those most responsible insulated
themselves from detection by issuing orders and never directly participating in the
atrocities.86
Even when the evidence does exist, it is often hard to judge individuals for
embracing what was, at the time, the prevalent norm.87 Individual perpetrators may
have been following orders. They may have feared for their own lives if they did not.
In Argentina, for example, the new democratic regime had to struggle with a law that
provided a legal excuse for those who committed crimes because they were ordered
to do so by superiors in the government or military.88 Police in America share the
racism that is endemic to our country. As scholars have pointed out, the criminal
charges incorporate that racism by asking jurors to determine whether or not the
police officer was reasonably afraid for his or her own safety—a doctrine whose
meaning depends on social stereotypes about black men.89
Even if the new regime finds a way (and many have) to bring criminal cases
against individuals, trials are not always ideal for memorializing complex events.90
Rules of evidence, burdens of proof, and other procedural restrictions can undermine
or mangle the truth in ways that break the narrative and make reconciliation more
difficult. In guilty pleas and trials, unlike in truth commissions, defendants have
incentives to deny the truth and undermine the credibility of the victim.91 If the
defendant pleads guilty, then the victim and witnesses do not have the chance to
recount their story.
International law scholarship offers insight into the problem of police shootings.
The parallel shows how vital it is to enforce particular kinds of criminal laws. It
highlights the structural cost to the democratic system of failing to do so. Police use
81

Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of
Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 588-89 (2005).
82

See Bohl, supra note 78, at 557.
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See Malamud-Goti, supra note 79, at 2.
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See MARTHA MINOW, VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 45 (1998).

85

See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND
ATROCITY IN TIMES OF TRANSITION 1-2, 148-49 (2002).
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Kamali, supra note 73, at 132.
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Id. at 99.
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Malamud-Goti, supra note 79, at 2-3.
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See generally Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 398-462 (1996) (analyzing how
socially constructed stereotypes about blacks have shaped self-defense law).
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of unreasonable force against African-Americans qualifies as this type of crime
because the failure to prosecute implicates fundamental democratic values. The
failure to prosecute undermines the legitimacy and durability of our system as a
whole. The scholarly debate about the role of criminal law enforcement in nascent
democracies gives perspective on the potential role of the law, particularly of
criminal trials, in the United States. Citizens crave retribution after periods of mass
atrocity, but most scholars argue for a different justification for criminal law
enforcement. Criminal justice may satisfy the desire and moral imperative of
retribution, but most international law scholars agree that the law is more effective in
communicating and inculcating a new set of values. Domestic criminal law has an
important role to play in beginning to distance the country from its racist past,
disentangling criminal law enforcement from its role in maintaining white
supremacy.
III. HOW TO HANDLE THE CASE?
Failing to prosecute police for using unreasonable force against AfricanAmericans has a corrosive effect on democracy. It deepens a distrust that has been
breeding for generations.92 As many scholars and activists have argued, the
American criminal justice system was born and nurtured on racism.93 It has remained
a tool of racial domination while retaining the legitimating semblance of a colorblind system.94 Like regimes in transition from repressive totalitarianism to
democracy, our own system needs to shed the past. While, of course, this cannot be
done in an instant, one step toward embracing a new set of values must involve
prosecution of police brutality. High-profile cases can serve to both embrace and
broadcast new values. The dysfunction in our system can, ironically, provide an
opportunity to disavow the past and begin to introduce new values for the future.
Taking this progress as the goal, it seems clear that there ought to be a limited
duty to charge in police shooting cases. Prosecuting police for excessive use of force
is difficult.95 Cases are often hard to prove.96 Prosecutors are often reluctant to
charge police because the prosecutors work closely with the department and rely on
officers to bring cases.97 Even when it seems as if the proof is readily available and
prosecutors do pursue the case, juries often fail to convict.98 As with human rights
abuses under totalitarian regimes, it is complicated to impose a new set of norms on
92
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SOC. INQUIRY 406, 407-08 (2015).
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(2016).
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actors who were operating in an unjust system. The law governing use of force is
unclear.99 Racist perceptions can fuel excuses for justification, which juries may
endorse.100 To charge and prosecute every alleged case would not only be unjust, but
could potentially compound the problem. The acquittals and dropped charges in the
Freddie Gray case, for instance, did not transmit a message about racial equality and
the criminal justice system.101 In fact, it transmitted quite the opposite message.
It would be an abuse of discretion to fail to prosecute a police officer for shooting
an unarmed black man if there is sufficient evidence to support the charge.
Prosecutors have a duty to do justice.102 Given the history of race and the criminal
justice system—as well as the impact the failure to prosecute has had on AfricanAmerican communities in particular and the criminal justice system in general—
failure to charge in these sorts of cases amounts to an abdication of that duty.103 Of
course, even this new obligation leaves prosecutors in charge of determining whether
sufficient evidence exists, but it imposes an additional burden on them in this class
of cases. The duty implies an obligation to investigate.104 It would be insufficient to
conclude that a police shooting does not warrant charges unless the prosecutor has
thoroughly investigated the case and determined that there is insufficient evidence to
support criminal charges.105 In other words, a prosecutor must investigate even when
doing so would alienate the police department on which the prosecutor depends.106
Criminal prosecutions ought to serve a salutary function. Just as in the
international context, these trials should expose racial injustice and bias in criminal
law enforcement. The first step to purging racism is to admit in a public way that it
exists. Ideally, a public trial can educate the populace and reinforce or even help
forge new national values.107 While victims and activists seek retribution, the desire
99
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for punishment is only a partial purpose of the criminal justice system. In addition,
as international scholars have demonstrated, part of the purpose of the law in
transitional moments is to reinforce a new set of values. Public prosecutions of
police who can be proved guilty of using excessive force against African-Americans
will offer a counter-narrative. If the criminal justice system in America tends to tell
the story of dangerous black men plaguing society with brutal crimes, the
prosecution of the police can offer a new narrative, just as the innocence movement
has.108
Even if prosecutors were to charge every police shooting that the evidence
supports, there are limits to the criminal law’s capacity to serve an expressive
function. Trials can be a valuable tool for articulating shared values, but they are
often inadequate. State and federal governments should look to supplement these
trials with a domestic version of “truth commissions.”109 As international law
scholars have argued, these arenas offer a cathartic experience for victims while
involving the entire community in a reevaluation of beliefs and core values.110 A
limited duty to prosecute should accommodate alternate mechanisms like truth
commissions, which have proved effective in instilling new values.111 They have the
benefit of allowing a full narrative, which exceeds the scope of a criminal trial.
Legislative hearings might serve this function on a smaller scale. In this setting,
victims and activists could speak without the constraints of evidentiary rules.
Moreover, police could participate without the fear of criminal punishment. This
type of dialog is a necessary complement to prosecution in moving away from the
racial injustice that has marred the criminal justice system and jeopardized the
foundations of democracy. If the limited duty to prosecute in police use-of-force
cases is seen as animated by a desire to deter criminal acts and create a new
narrative, then it is consistent with other mechanisms, like truth commissions.112
IV. CONCLUSION
The duty to charge in police shooting cases derives from the expressive and
deterrent value of criminal law. It is not, therefore, absolute. Unlike retributivism,
these criminal justice theories cannot support a duty to charge every case. They do,
however, point to the severe need to address this type of crime. They call on the
criminal justice system to view this crime, which implicates the foundation of
democracy, differently. Thus, there is an absolute duty to investigate police killings
of unarmed black men, and there is a limited duty to charge when the evidence
supports conviction.
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